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20 April 1960

Comment on ONE Memorandum on The Kurds in 1959

1. GG/N is not in the estimate business and did not write this report as an estimate. It was written for a particular requester who has already expressed himself as being pleased with the product, and was provided to ONE only as a courtesy.
2. It is particularly unfortunate that ONE cannot make the same informal approach in taking exception to a report that members of D/GG make when they wish to differ with a contribution to an estimate. On 29 December 1959, **25X1A9a** took exception to a State Department contribution to a National Estimate on Iran, specifically to its attitude of complacency towards a possible uprising of Kurds. The matter was discussed with **25X1A9a** who asked for an informal statement on the Kurds. This statement, GP 60-2:L, is included as Attachment A. Please note the first paragraph which is very similar to page 25 of GR L-60-2. At no time did **25X1A9a** take exception to **25X1A9a** oral or printed comments prior to 14 April 1960.
3. The "meeting of intelligence community specialists" on 2 April 1959 interestingly enough did not include GG/N personnel nor did it include **25X1A9a** DD/P, who was deeply concerned with Kurdish affairs. As a matter of fact GG/N has not found anyone in the intelligence community who professes to be an "expert" on Kurdish matters. All of the most knowledgeable people are very modest and, we believe, rightfully so. DD/P/NE/FI has repeatedly told us that no one has the answers on the Kurds. Probably one of the justifiable reasons for our

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differing from the "intelligence specialists" is that, between 2 April 1959 and 1 April 1960, GG/N has spent 1800 professional man hours studying the Kurds. In the course of this study GG/N has attempted to locate persons who could contribute or comment intelligently. No persons with knowledge in depth were found although many professed "interest." The two most knowledgeable individuals are William Eagleton and Lee Dinsmore, foreign service officers currently in Tabriz and Baghdad, respectively. These men are presently dealing with Kurdish affairs, know many Kurds personally, and have influenced the thinking of GG/N. Dinsmore's despatch #640 from Baghdad, dated 27 January 1960, ends as follows:

"An autonomous Kurdistan might be one of the first consequences of an overthrow of the Shah's regime."

4. The ONE memorandum of 14 April 1960 takes a highly subjective approach, in paragraph 1 b. using the phrases: "looks wrong," "misleading list of factors," and "distorts the ... Soviet role." These are phrases that have the effect of discrediting by their tenor rather than disproving by solid argument. Paragraph 2 of this memorandum appears to indicate that ONE hoped to allay fears of Kurdish troubles by its 2 April 1959 meeting, and does not want the problem opened up again. In spite of the facts that the President of the United States in late April 1959, directed NSA to develop a capability on the Kurds and that requirements on the Kurds were sent out soon thereafter by CIA, Army, Navy, Air, and State, ONE has not held another meeting on this subject to our knowledge.

5. There seems to be complete agreement in the intelligence community on the point that military control is a fundamental factor affecting

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Kurdish quiescence. The prognostication in GR L 60-2 is based on possible loss of military control by a parent government -- an eventuality of considerable concern to the community.

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